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Nietzsche Contra God: A Battle Within 
by Eva Cybulska 
Abstract 
Nietzsche’s name has become almost synonymous with militant atheism. Born into a pious Christian 
family, this son of a Lutheran pastor declared himself the Antichrist. But could this have been yet 
another of his masks of hardness? Nietzsche rarely revealed his innermost self in the published 
writings, and this can be gleaned mainly from his private letters and the accounts of friends. These 
sources bring to light the philosopher’s inner struggle with his own, deeply religious nature. 
Losing his father at a young age was a calamity from which Nietzsche never recovered, and I 
argue that his famous thought-image “God is dead” was a transfiguration of the painful memory 
of this loss. In this essay, I trace Nietzsche’s tortuous path from an ardent devotee of God to a 
vociferous critic of Christianity, a path that was punctuated with veiled longings for a loving 
deity. Deep in his heart, he remained faithful to Christian ideals. Rather like Cordelia, the only 
truly loving daughter of King Lear, Nietzsche refused to utter words of intense affection and 
reverence, as these had been blatantly devalued and corrupted. Instead, he adopted a mask of a 
wrongdoer and a blasphemer who took not the punishment but the guilt. 
Nietzsche’s attitude to religion is discussed from the perspective of his life, his personality, and his 
mental condition. The discussion draws on psychoanalytical concepts of Freud, Erikson, Winnicott 
and Kohut. This is not an exclusive reading, but complementary to other studies in this field. 
I am one thing, my writings are another. 
(Nietzsche, 1888) 
I have been since 1876 more a battlefield than a man. 
(Nietzsche, 1882) 
Introduction 
“Atheism is the secret of religion.” 
(Feuerbach, 1843/2008, p. ix) 
Nietzsche has earned the reputation of being the most 
audacious of God-assassins. In The Gay Science, the 
madman announces that “God is dead ... . And we have 
killed him”. He then poses the question to the crowd: 
“Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear 
worthy of it?” (Nietzsche,  1882/1974, pp. 181-182). But 
gods had been dying long before Nietzsche dazzled 
the world with this unsettling image. Egyptian Osiris, 
Greek Dionysus, as well as Jesus Christ, suffered death, 
followed by a form of resurrection. The impulse to kneel 
at the altars of godly might, accompanied by an equally 
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strong urge to reclaim the “divinity within”, has proved 
a persistent theme in humanity’s history. It also formed 
a pivotal conflict in Nietzsche’s life and philosophy. 
 
Prometheus, a mythical personification of rebellion 
against the power of the gods, stole fire from Olympus 
and offered it to humanity; a daring act for which he 
was severely punished. As a teenager, Nietzsche wrote 
a play about Prometheus in which he already showed a 
fascination with the theme of a dying god, Zeus. Later, 
in the manner of his protagonist, he rebelled against 
the Christian God by enlightening humanity about the 
human, rather than divine, origin of morality. 
 
Undoubtedly, Nietzsche’s views on Christianity were 
shaped by the Zeitgeist of his time. This was infused 
with a mounting religious scepticism, as voiced by 
philosophers such as Feuerbach and Schopenhauer. 
Momentous scientific discoveries, along with growing 
psychological awareness and emergent existentialism, 
paved the way for the “death of God”. Perhaps it all 
started with Copernicus, that Christian revolutionary, 
whose daring work forever changed the direction of 
human thought. “Since Copernicus, man seems to have 
been on a downward path, – now he seems to be rolling 
faster and faster away from the centre – where to? 
into nothingness, into the piercing sensation of his 
nothingness?” (Nietzsche, 1887/1994a, p. 122). Other 
intellectual giants, such as Galileo Galilei, Isaac 
Newton, Giordano Bruno and Charles Darwin joined 
the army of “involuntary assassins”. Some even risked 
being burnt alive at the stake for heresy. 
 
Blaise Pascal was alarmed by the prospect of human 
loneliness in the universe: “the eternal silence of these 
infinite spaces terrifies me” (Pascal, 1670/2011, p. 28). 
Kant, with his “Copernican revolution”, revealed a deep 
cleft between the scientific and the religious sides of 
human nature and declared: “I will that there be a God, 
that my existence in this world be also an existence in 
a pure world of the understanding …” (Kant, 1788/ 
2015, p. 115). Outwardly a pious Christian, he may 
have unwittingly contributed to a godless worldview. 
On reading Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Heinrich 
Heine, admired by Nietzsche, commented: “Do you 
hear the little bell tinkle? Kneel down – one brings the 
sacraments for a dying God” (cited by Kaufmann, 1950/ 
1974, p. 100). All the above-mentioned thinkers, well 
known to Nietzsche, played a role in “unchaining this 
earth from its sun” and “our straying as through an 
infinite nothing” (see below). In this light, his thought-
image “God is dead” reads more like a lament than an 
assault. 
 
In secondary literature, relatively little has been said 
about how Nietzsche’s own life and personality may 
have affected his views on Christianity. This essay is an 
attempt to redress this imbalance. Lou Salomé (1894/ 
2001), Roberts (1998), Kee (1999) and Benson (2008), 
among others, considered Nietzsche to be a deeply 
religious man, despite his outward atheism. I concur 
with their view. Perhaps the Antichrist, as Nietzsche 
called himself, was yet another mask of hardness, behind 
which stood a reverent, spiritual, albeit embattled, self. 
 
From a Pious Christian to the Antichrist 
 
You want to create the world before which you can kneel: 
this is your ultimate hope and intoxication. 
 (Nietzsche, 1883-85/1969a, p. 136) 
 
I attack only causes that are victorious ... 
(Nietzsche, 1888/1986, p. 47) 
 
Nietzsche was born into a pious Christian family, and 
many of his ancestors on both sides were clergymen, 
including his father, a distinguished Lutheran pastor. 
The values and traditions of Christianity permeated his 
childhood and youth. At school, he was renowned for 
reciting by heart hymns and long passages from the 
Bible, and this earned him the nickname “the little 
pastor”. As a boy of 13, Nietzsche wrote in his diary: “in 
everything God has safely guided me … . I have firmly 
determined to serve him forever” (cited by Brobjer, 
2000, p. 2). After reading Feuerbach at the age of 17, he 
wrote to his friends Wilhelm Pinder and Gustav Krug: 
“Christianity is essentially a question of the heart … . 
The main teachings of Christianity only relate the 
fundamental truths of the human heart; they are 
symbols …” (ibid., p. 3). Around the same time, he 
wrote a poem, Vor dem Kruzifix, which depicted a 
drunkard throwing a bottle of Schnapps at the figure of 
the crucified Christ. And yet, in his graduation speech 
at Pforta School, Nietzsche read: 
 
Once more, before I wander on 
and turn my glance forward, 
I lift up my hands to you in loneliness –  
you, to whom I flee, 
to whom in the deepest depth of my heart 
I have solemnly consecrated altars, 
so that your voice 
might summon me again. [...] 
 
I want to know you, Unknown One, 
you who have reached deep into my soul, 
into my life like a gust of a storm, 
you incomprehensible yet related one! 
I want to know you, even serve you. 
 
(Nietzsche, To the Unknown God, in Grundlehner, 
1986, pp. 25-26) 
 
Nietzsche’s early atheism could be described as stoic, 
with a predominantly intellectual aura. However, after 
parting with Wagner, his great idol, he would declare 
war on all his idols and ideals. In On the Genealogy of 
Morality, Nietzsche presented his most incisive and 
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provocative critique of Christianity. He challenged the 
centuries-old view that moral values had a divine origin, 
and traced the historical origin of guilt, conscience, law 
and justice to human custom: 
 
Have these genealogists of morality up to 
now ever remotely dreamt that, for example, 
the main moral concept ‘Schuld’ (guilt) 
descends from the very material concept of 
‘Schulden’ (‘debts’)? Or that punishment, 
as retribution, evolved quite independently 
of any assumption about freedom or lack 
of freedom of the will? (Nietzsche, 1887/ 
1994a, p. 43) 
 
Nietzsche disparaged Saint Paul’s interpretation of the 
crucifixion of Jesus as designed to burden humanity with 
debt and guilt (in German, the word Schuld has both 
meanings). By contrast, 
 
The [Greek] gods served to justify man to a 
certain degree, even if he were in the wrong 
they served as causes of evil – they did not, 
at that time, take the punishment on them-
selves, but rather, as is nobler, the guilt ... .  
(ibid., p. 70) 
 
This view seems to have logically led to his notion 
that the truly loving God should do nothing but wrong 
(see below). 
 
Philosophers Without Gods (Antony, 2007), a collection 
of personal essays, offers insight into atheistic points 
of view as held by several contemporary philosophers. 
For some, atheism is a natural outcome of increasing 
doubt in the supernatural, sparked by consciousness 
of logical inconsistencies in religious worldviews. Such 
“rational atheism” is generally a private affair which 
entails standing aside in relation to the existence of a 
deity. For others, the battle between reason and faith is 
more complex and involves periods of uncertainty and 
even a return to faith. The fiercest battles, however, 
are fought between contrary emotions, as was the case 
with Nietzsche for most of his creative life. 
 
The more intense the conflict, the more militant the 
atheism; the personal becomes political. Vitz (2013) 
holds that intense atheism is rooted in a particular 
background and fuelled by “the peculiar  psychological 
needs” of its proponents (p. 3). A militant atheist moves 
not so much away from God as he moves against God; 
in short, he becomes an anti-theist. Vitz proposes the 
“defective father hypothesis” as an explanation for 
intense atheism, largely based on Freud’s assumption 
that “the personal God is, psychologically, nothing other 
than an exalted father” (Freud, 1910/1985, p. 216). 
Young Nietzsche wrote: 
 
In everything God has led me safely as a 
father leads his weak little child ... . I have 
firmly resolved within me to dedicate myself 
for ever to his service … . Like a child I trust 
in his grace … . All he gives I will joyfully 
accept: happiness and unhappiness, poverty 
and riches, and boldly confront even death, 
which shall one day unite us all in eternal 
joy [ewige Freude] and bliss. (Aus meinem 
Leben, 1858, cited by Hayman, 1995, p. 26) 
 
Using Bowlby’s attachment theory, Vitz examines the 
effects of an insecure attachment to the father in child-
hood on a person’s religiosity in later life. Those with an 
insecure attachment are said to experience a higher level 
of religiosity, which can oscillate between extremes, with 
sudden religious conversion as common as an equally 
sudden apostasy. Nietzsche’s case is a good example of 
a radical shift from devout religiosity to militant atheism, 
a dramatic turn which may have been psychologically 
rooted in the early loss of his father. 
 
From the perspective of Erikson’s psychosocial theory, 
Nietzsche was bound to face a “crisis of autonomy” (see 
Erikson, 1959/1994). Losing his father at an early age 
implied that he never had the chance to negotiate his 
own psychological sovereignty. Passionately identifying 
with Brutus in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, Nietzsche 
wrote: 
 
Independence of the soul! 0 that is at stake 
here. No sacrifice can be too great for that: 
one must be capable of sacrificing one’s 
dearest friend for it, even if he should also be 
the most glorious human being, an ornament 
to the world, a genius without peer – if one 
loves freedom as the freedom of great souls 
and he threatens this kind of freedom. That 
is what Shakespeare must have felt. ... 
(Nietzsche, 1882/1974, p. 150) 
 
Was not Nietzsche speaking of himself here? His need 
for independence of the soul was matched in intensity 
only by his longing for a loving deity: 
 
Strike deeper! 
Strike once again! 
Sting and sting, shutter this heart! 
What means this torment 
With blunt arrow? 
Why do you look down, 
Unwearied of human pain, 
With malicious divine flashing eyes? 
Will not kill, 
Only torment, torment? 
Why – torment me, 
You malicious, unknown God? […] 
 
Away! 
He himself has fled, 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology  Volume 16, Editions 1 & 2       October 2016       Page 4 of 12 
 
 
© The Author(s). This Open Access article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons License [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0]. 
The IPJP is published in association with NISC (Pty) Ltd and Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 
www.ipjp.org 
My last only companion, 
My great enemy, 
My unknown, 
My Hangman-God! – 
 
No! Come back, 
With all your torments! 
Oh come back 
To the last of all solitaries! 
All the streams of my tears  
Run their course to you! 
And the last flame of my heart – 
It burns up to you! 
Oh come back, 
My unknown God! My pain!  
My last – happiness! 
 
  (Nietzsche, 1883-85/1969a, p. 267) 
 
In this poem, “The Sorcerer”, Nietzsche wishes (or 
commands?) God to depart and to return. It brings to 
mind Freud’s “repetition compulsion”, an unconscious 
tendency to repeat a major traumatic experience in a 
vain attempt to endure it. The theme of abandonment 
and return resurfaced as “Ariadne’s Lament” in his last 
creative year. He also wrote with rage, possibly fuelled 
by his dysphoric, elated mood: 
 
Christianity is a metaphysics of the hang-
man. (Nietzsche, 1888/1976a, p. 500) 
 
Christianity has corrupted the reason even 
of those strongest in spirit by teaching men 
to consider the supreme values of the spirit 
as something sinful ... . (Nietzsche 1888/ 
1976b, p. 571) 
 
God degenerated into the contradiction of 
life, instead of being its eternal transfigura- 
tion and Yes! (ibid., p. 585) 
 
Was Nietzsche hurling insults at God in an attempt to 
provoke his response? If so, God remained silent. 
 
The battle between the need for the independence of the 
soul and the equally strong need to surrender to loving 
God fuelled Nietzsche’s philosophy. Lou Salomé, who 
knew him personally, observed: 
 
Only when we enter Nietzsche’s last phase 
of philosophy will it become completely 
clear to what extent the religious drive always 
dominated his being and his knowledge. His 
various philosophies are for him just so many 
surrogates for God, which were intended to 
help him to compensate for a mystical God-
ideal outside of himself. His last years, then, 
are a confession that he was not able to do 
without this ideal. And precisely because 
of that, time and again we come upon his 
impassioned battle against religion, belief in 
God, and the need for salvation because he 
came precariously close to them. (Salomé, 
1894/2001, pp. 88-89) 
 
The Eternal Return of Loss and Pain 
 
If one has a character, one also has one’s typical experience 
which returns repeatedly. 
(Nietzsche, 1886/1990, p. 91) 
 
The death of his father before his fifth birthday was a 
tragic blow of fate from which Nietzsche was never able 
to recover. He later recalled in his memoir: 
 
I was born in Röcken, near Lützen, on 
October 15, 1844 and I received in holy 
baptism the name Friedrich Wilhelm. My 
father was the preacher in this village  ... . 
Gifted in spirit and heart, adorned with all 
the virtues of a Christian, he lived a tranquil, 
simple, yet happy life, respected and loved 
by all who knew him. … If there is one 
image that cannot be erased from my soul, 
surely I will never forget the familiar 
parsonage. For it was incised in my soul 
by a mighty stylus. ... 
 
In September 1848 my beloved father 
suddenly became mentally ill. … We sent 
for the famous doctor Opolcer who, to our 
consternation, took the illness to be a 
softening of the brain [Gehirnserweichung]. 
... Finally, he went blind and had to endure 
his suffering in eternal [ewigen] darkness. 
My beloved father had to bear horrific 
[ungeheure] pain. ... Then he fell asleep 
quietly and blessedly. †††† on July 27, 
1849. When I woke up in the morning I 
heard all around me weeping and sobbing. 
My dear mother came to me with tears and 
cried out: “Oh, God! My good Ludwig is 
dead [todt]!” … The thought that I would be 
separated forever from the beloved Father 
[den geliebten Vater] seized me, and I wept 
bitterly. … On the second of August the 
earthly remains of my father were consigned 
to the womb of the earth. … At one o’ 
clock in the afternoon the ceremonies 
began, with the bells pealing their loud 
knell. Oh, I shall never forget their hollow 
clangour in my ears. … Our pain was 
horrific [ungeheure]. (Nietzsche, 1854-1861/ 
1994b, pp. 4-6) 
 
Nietzsche seemed to have recreated the lost paradise of 
his childhood when he became a frequent house-guest 
at Wagner’s residence in Tribschen (Switzerland). The 
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idyll of Röcken was transfigured into the idyll of 
Tribschen. But the bliss did not last, and Nietzsche 
walked out on his eight-year intense friendship with 
Wagner in early August of 1876. On this occasion, he 
abandoned the man whom he loved rather than waiting 
to be abandoned by him. His life was never the same 
thereafter. His health deteriorated immediately, and a 
few years later he resigned from his position at the 
University of Basel as a professor of philology. In the 
manner of Hamlet, with whom Nietzsche felt a deep 
affinity, he was now completely alone: 
 
Lonely now and miserably self-distrustful, I 
took sides, not without resentment, against 
myself and for everything that hurt me and 
was hard to me. Thus I once more found the 
way to that courageous pessimism that is 
the antithesis of all romantic fraud, and as it 
seems to me today, the way to ‘myself’, to 
my task. (Nietzsche, 1876-1886/1913, p. 13) 
 
Nietzsche’s subsequent philosophy can be seen as an 
attempt to transfigure the pain of his great disillusion-
ment and loss. Human, All Too Human, his first book 
after the break up with Wagner, marked the beginning 
of a struggle with his deeply cherished ideals and idols, 
and of a relentless agon with himself. Could it be that the 
memory of his dead father returned to him as an image 
of a dead God? The passage reads: 
 
The madman – Have you not heard of that 
madman who lit a lantern in the bright 
morning hours, ran to the market place, and 
cried incessantly, “I seek God! I seek God!” 
– As many of those who did not believe in 
God were standing around just then, he 
provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? 
Asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? 
asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid 
of us? Has he gone on a voyage? Or emi-
grated? – Thus they yelled and laughed. 
 
The madman jumped into their midst and 
pierced them with his eyes. “Whither is 
God?” he cried. “I shall tell you. We have 
killed him – you and I. All of us are 
murderers. But how did we do this? How 
could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the 
sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? 
What were we doing when we unchained 
this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving 
now? Away from all suns? Are we not 
plunging continually? Backward, sideward, 
forward, in all directions? Is there still any 
up or down? Are we not straying as through 
an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the 
breath of empty space? Has it not become 
colder? Is not night continually closing in 
on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in 
the morning? Do we not hear nothing as yet 
of the noise of the gravediggers who are 
burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet 
of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, 
decompose. God is dead [Gott ist todt]. God 
remains dead. And we have killed him. 
 
 “How shall we comfort ourselves, the 
murderers of all murderers? What was 
holiest and mightiest of all that the world 
has yet owned has bled to death under our 
knives: who will wipe this blood from us? 
What water is there for us to clean our-
selves? What festivals of atonement, what 
sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not 
the greatness of this deed too great for us? 
Must we ourselves not become gods simply 
to appear worthy of it? There has never been 
a greater deed, and whoever is born after us 
– for the sake of this deed he will belong to 
a higher history than all history hitherto.” 
 
Here the madman fell silent and looked 
again at his listeners; and they, too, were 
silent and stared at him in astonishment. At 
last he threw his lantern on the ground, and 
it broke into pieces and went out. “I come 
too early”, he said then; “my time is not yet”. 
This horrific [ungeheure] event is still on its 
way … . (Nietzsche, 1882/1974, pp. 181-
182) 
 
Several images coalesce in this astounding phantasm. 
In the recollection of his father’s death, Nietzsche says 
the (rather than my) beloved father, a phrase that can 
equally be interpreted as father the man and as Father 
our God. He uses the words todt (dead) and ungeheure 
(horrific, monstrous) on both occasions, rather like 
musical leitmotivs. The mournful mood of this passage 
is reminiscent of Heine’s image of bringing sacraments 
to a dying God. It also resonates with Pascal’s “terror 
of infinite spaces”, and conveys Nietzsche’s “loneliest 
loneliness” of existence in a godless universe.   
 
The image of a decomposing body of Christ is central 
to Dostoyevsky’s novel The Idiot (Dostoyevsky 1869/ 
1983), a book Nietzsche probably read sometime after 
writing the above fragment. Dostoyevsky visited Basel 
in 1867 and was said to have had an epileptic fit after 
seeing Holbein’s painting “The Body of the Dead Christ 
in the Tomb” in the Kunstmuseum. This experience was 
re-enacted by Prince Myshkin, the chief protagonist of 
the novel. Nietzsche, who lived and taught in Basel for 
a decade, may have seen the painting too. If he had, the 
image of Christ’s decomposing body in the painting 
could have merged with that of the decomposing body 
of his father during that fateful summer of 1849. The 
Hamletian ghost of the father had returned to haunt 
him. 
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Inheriting the Father’s “Sin”? 
 
What was silent in the father speaks in the son, and often I   
found the son the unveiled secret of the father. 
(Nietzsche, 1883-85/ 1969a, p. 212) 
 
The diagnosis of Pastor Nietzsche’s fatal illness was an 
enigmatic “softening of the brain” (Gehirnserweichung). 
Intriguingly, this diagnosis was not made post-mortem, 
but while he was still alive. After yet another health 
crisis, Nietzsche wrote to a friend, Karl von Gersdorff: 
 
I could no longer doubt that I am plagued 
by a serious illness of the brain, and that 
my stomach and my eyes suffer only 
because of this illness in the central 
nervous system. My father died at age 
thirty-six of an inflammation of the brain 
[Gehirnentzündung]; it is possible that 
matters will move more quickly in my case 
… . There is as yet no real convalescence; 
my uncanny state has not been alleviated; 
at every instant I am reminded of him. 
(Nietzsche to K. von Gersdorff, January 
18, 1876; cited by Krell & Bates, 1997, p. 
93) 
 
In the play Ghosts, which deals with a son’s fear of 
having inherited syphilis from his father, Ibsen too uses 
the phrase “softening of the brain” (Ibsen, 1881/1964, 
Act III, p. 98). The term Gehirnserweichung was, 
moreover, used in nineteenth century Germany to denote 
dementia paralytica (tertiary syphilis). This condition 
cannot be inherited from one’s father, and, in the case 
of congenital syphilis, the mother has to be infected. 
But inheriting syphilis from the father was a common 
belief at that time. Whilst in Nietzsche’s time there were 
no tests for this disease (these were devised in the mid-
twentieth century), over 60% of inmates in mental 
asylums in Europe were diagnosed as syphilitic. Clearly, 
the fear, not medical knowledge, was responsible for 
such a misdiagnosis (Cybulska, 2000). We shall never 
know the cause of the pastor’s death (tuberculous 
meningitis is one possibility), but almost certainly it was 
not syphilis. What matters, however, is Nietzsche’s 
interpretation of his illness. Could he have thought that 
his father had died of syphilis, a secret never to be 
spoken of? If he did, one can only imagine his horror, 
especially given that acquiring syphilis was considered 
synonymous with leading an immoral life. It would 
have meant inheriting not only the father’s illness, but 
also his “sin”. Rather like Osvald, the tragic hero of 
Ibsen’s play, Nietzsche often feared insanity and thought 
that he may have inherited this curse from his father. 
 
Nietzsche viewed sin, guilt and punishment as moral 
prejudices, and accused Christianity of diabolising Eros: 
“the passions become evil and malicious if they are 
regarded as evil and malicious” (Nietzsche, 1881/1982, 
p. 45). Although Nietzsche blamed Saint Paul for this, 
the concept of “inherited sin” had been a tenet of Judeo-
Christian morality much earlier. In the Old Testament, 
there are numerous passages speaking of “visiting the 
iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the 
children’s children, unto the third and to the fourth 
generation” (Exodus 34:7). Nietzsche must have known 
these passages well. 
 
Nietzsche’s tendency, throughout his life, to oscillate  
between extreme idealizations and equally extreme 
devaluations (particularly in relation to Wagner and 
Christianity) may have been a sequel of not having 
received adequate psychological care following the 
illness and death of his father. Children’s idealisation 
of their parents could be a matter of survival; a good and 
omniscient parent plays a protective role in an immature 
and vulnerable psyche. However, in the process of 
growing up, a healthy disillusionment sets in, and a child 
learns that parents have faults and limitations. To recall 
Winnicott’s concept of a “good enough mother”, a 
parent must fail – but in such a manner that the child can 
cope with the disillusionment (Winnicott, 1982, pp. 145-
146). I propose a concept of a “good enough father” to 
denote the vital role that a father plays in facilitating a 
child’s healthy disillusionment in him, and indeed in any 
ideal. The father also provides a realistic “mirroring”, 
so that the child’s budding self is acknowledged and 
internalised. An inability to reconcile conflicting feelings 
about oneself and others is conducive to rebellion in 
adolescence. If this is not contained by the parents, it 
may result in a lifelong tendency to oscillate between 
idealisation and devaluation. And this, I suggest, was 
Nietzsche’s predicament. Regrettably, Wagner, whom 
he loved as a father-like figure, not only failed to contain 
his idealisation, but used it for his own narcissistic 
needs (see Cybulska, 2015). Nietzsche’s subsequent 
attack on his former idol was the consequence of an 
inevitable disappointment and abrupt devaluation. As 
Kohut (1976) pertinently warned, sudden, intolerable 
disappointment in the idealised object could lead to a 
calamitous fragmentation of the ego, particularly when 
the emphatic early mirroring had been insufficient. In the 
absence of a containing relationship, the ego may turn 
to self-aggrandisement, even self-deification. And such 
was the case with Nietzsche. 
 
One cannot help but wonder whether Nietzsche’s fierce 
assault on Christian morality was not propelled by an 
unacknowledged resentment related to his father’s 
illness and death. Perhaps by attacking Christianity as a 
“split off” part-object of the father, he could preserve 
a much cherished ideal of him? Freud (1924/1983, p. 
217), given his interest in a “splitting and projection” 
defence mechanism, stated: “it is possible for the ego to 
avoid a rupture … by effecting a cleavage or division 
of itself”. A split off part of an idealised object can be 
projected onto something else and then attacked by 
proxy. 
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Dancing with Dionysus at the Edge of the Abyss 
 
I would believe only in a God who knew how to dance. 
(Nietzsche, 1883-85/1969a, p. 68) 
 
If there were gods, how could I endure not to be a god! 
(ibid., p. 110) 
 
Nietzsche’s first book, The Birth of Tragedy from the 
Spirit of Music (1872/1993), could be regarded as his 
philosophical and also personal manifesto. On having 
completed a draft of the book, he confessed to his friend 
Erwin Rohde: “In addition to many depressed moods 
and half moods, I have also had a few quite elated ones 
and have given some sign of this in the small work I 
mentioned” (cited in Middleton, 1996, p. 79). And his 
oscillating moods, from manic elation and dysphoria to 
melancholic despair, continued to fuel his creativity 
(Cybulska, 2000). 
  
Not accidentally, Nietzsche proclaimed Dionysus, the 
dismembered and then resurrected god of the Greek 
pantheon, the god of dark unconscious forces, of excess 
and frenzy, as his patron. Ambiguity lies at the heart of 
the Dionysian Mysteries: the god who is the principle 
of indestructible life is simultaneously the god of death 
and the dead. Dionysus is also a god of dissonance and 
equally of ecstasy. Dissonance denotes disharmony or 
conflict, while ecstasy (a state of bliss) derives from 
the Greek word ekstasis, meaning standing outside 
oneself. Wagner was the ultimate master of dissonance 
and ecstasy, and this greatly attracted Nietzsche to his 
music. Dionysus, a god of wine and inebriation, is also 
a god of grief and tears. The oldest account of a wine 
harvest in European literature (Homer, Iliad, c. 750 BC, 
XVIII, ll. 561-572) carries a note of grief. In ancient 
Greece, at the time of the wine harvest, young girls and 
boys would stride down the path leading to the vines, 
carrying baskets full of grapes. A boy playing a lyre 
customarily walked with them, singing the Linos, the 
song of lamentation expressing grief for a god that was 
being dismembered (Kerényi, 1976, pp. 65-67). Not 
surprisingly, the German words wein and weinen (wine 
and to weep) share the same root, and the English wine 
and whine are homophonic. 
 
For Nietzsche, the moments of transfiguration of pain 
into bliss became highly appealing. Overcoming pain 
and suffering must have given him a sense of mastery: 
“I took myself in hand, I made myself healthy again ... 
I made out of my will to health, to life, my philosophy” 
(Nietzsche1888/1986, p. 40). But this “great health”, 
which he considered to be a victory of his will, was only 
an illusory, pyrrhic victory of mania. In early January of 
1889, in his Turin lodgings, he danced naked and sang 
loudly to the accompaniment of Wagner’s erotic music, 
his brilliant mind engulfed by madness. In the Dionysian 
spirit, he rejoiced in his own destruction, affirming the 
tragedy of his life: 
Saying Yes to life even in its strangest and 
hardest problems, the will to life rejoicing 
over its own inexhaustibility even in the very 
sacrifice of its highest types – that is what 
I called Dionysian, that is what I guessed 
to be the bridge to the psychology of the 
tragic poet. Not in order to be liberated from 
terror and pity, not in order to purge oneself 
of a dangerous affect by its vehement 
discharge – Aristotle understood it that 
way – but in order to be oneself the eternal 
joy of becoming, beyond all terror and pity 
– that joy which included even joy in 
destroying. (Nietzsche, 1888/1976a, pp. 562-
563) 
 
The “joy in destroying”, the fusion of pain and bliss 
and the mystic transformations of Dionysus mirrored 
Nietzsche’s own lived moments. In the epiphany he had 
at Sils-Maria in 1881, which gave birth to his enigmatic 
idea of Eternal Return, the abyss of pain intersected with 
the apogee of elation, a conjunction that would remain 
fixed in his mind (Cybulska, 2013). The memory of that 
mystical moment haunted him for the rest of his life: 
 
A philosopher who has traversed many 
kinds of health, and keeps traversing them, 
has passed through an equal number of 
philosophies; he simply cannot keep from 
transposing his states every time into the 
most spiritual form and distance: this art of 
transfiguration is philosophy. We philoso-
phers ... have to give birth to our thoughts 
out of our pain and, like mothers, endow 
them with all we have of blood, heart, fire, 
pleasure, passion, agony, conscience, fate, 
and catastrophe. (Nietzsche, 1882/1974, p. 
35) 
 
In the German original, Nietzsche uses the Latin word 
Transfiguration, which has greater religious resonance 
than the more commonly used German word Verklärung. 
He once was captivated by Raphael’s last painting, The 
Transfiguration, depicting Christ rising to heaven above 
the suffering crowd below, and interpreted its thrust in 
The Birth of Tragedy (1872/1993) as a “deification of 
individuation”, reflecting the “eternal contradiction” 
between Apollonian and Dionysian principles and yet 
their “reciprocal necessity” in so far as “the whole 
world of torment is necessary so that the individual 
can create the redeeming vision” (pp. 25-26). In his 
affirmative project, Nietzsche aimed to transfigure his 
pain and suffering into the ecstasy of becoming, and 
Dionysus became a symbolic vehicle for that alchemical 
process. Soon after his final Dionysian rite in Turin, he 
was admitted to a mental asylum, where he spent the 
last decade of his life in a state of oblivion. Perhaps it 
was for him a welcome release from the prison of self-
individuated consciousness and the pain of existence. 
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The Ultimate Sacrifice: Taking not the Punishment 
but the Guilt 
 
Devise the love that bears not only all punishment but also 
the guilt! 
(Nietzsche, 1883-85/1969a, p. 94) 
 
A god come to earth ought to do nothing whatever but 
wrong; to take upon oneself not the punishment but the guilt 
– only that would be godlike. 
(Nietzsche, 1888/1986, p. 45) 
 
Nietzsche’s name has often been associated with Nazi 
ideology, owing largely to his Machiavellian sister 
Elisabeth, who invited Hitler to her brother’s shrine in 
Weimar in 1934 and made an offering of his philosophy. 
The ideas such as “will to power” and Übermensch must 
have made an impression on the Führer. A disturbing 
passage reads: 
 
Not merely a master race whose sole task 
is to rule, but a race with its own sphere of 
life, with an excess of life, with an excess 
of strength for beauty, bravery, culture, 
manners to the highest peak of the spirit ... . 
(Nietzsche, 1883-88/1969b, p. 478) 
 
But did not Nietzsche court his own destiny? In his 
autobiography, Ecce Homo, he wrote: 
 
I know my fate. One day there will be 
associated with my name the recollection of 
something horrific [Ungeheure] – a crisis 
like no other before on earth, of the 
profoundest collision of conscience, of a 
decision evoked against everything that 
until then had been believed in, demanded, 
sanctified. I am not a man, I am dynamite. 
(Nietzsche, 1888/1986, p. 126) 
 
The title of the book is telling. The phrase ecce homo 
(“behold the man”) originates from Pontius Pilate, who 
presented the scourged Jesus Christ, bound and crowned 
with thorns, to a hostile crowd, shortly before his 
crucifixion. While on the verge of a total mental eclipse, 
Nietzsche signed several of his letters “The Crucified”. 
Jung considered Christ to be an embodiment of the self, 
which from a psychological angle corresponded to only 
one half of the archetype. The other half appears in the 
Antichrist. According to Jung (1951/1991), “this great 
symbol tells us that the progressive development and 
differentiation of consciousness leads to an ever more 
menacing awareness of the conflict and involves nothing 
less than a crucifixion of the ego, its agonizing 
suspension between irreconcilable opposites” (p. 44). 
 
During the summer of 1881, in a moment of ecstasy, the 
idea of Eternal Return of the Same (die Ewige Wieder-
kunft des Gleichen) suddenly invaded Nietzsche’s mind 
and became central to his philosophy and his life. It 
had an aura of religious revelation. He could not explain 
this idea, because mystical experiences are ineffable. 
Being beyond propositional scientific or philosophical 
knowledge, they are, as William James (1903) asserted, 
“more like states of feeling than like states of intellect” 
(p. 380). Nietzsche used the word Ewige/eternal (rather 
than unendlich/infinite), a word which frequently occurs 
in Lutheran liturgy; it is carved in the wooden vault of 
the Röcken church where he was baptised. The phrase 
Wiederkunft Christi denotes the Second Coming of 
Christ. Nietzsche’s friends observed that he spoke of his 
“secret” in a whisper and with a petrified expression 
on his face; not a reaction one would expect had it been 
a “life-affirming formula” (Cybulska, 2013). In March 
of 1884, he wrote to Overbeck: “I don’t exactly know 
how I have come to this – but it is possible that for the 
first time a thought has come to me that will break the 
history of humanity in two” (cited by Klossowski, 1997, 
p. 100). Is it possible that, in a psychotic moment, he 
envisioned himself as Christ’s Second Coming, with a 
kind of crucifixion as a part of his destiny? The question 
remains: did Nietzsche provoke his own “crucifixion” by 
letting his name be associated with something horrific 
– a crisis like no other before on earth? In his words: 
 
The “bringer of glad tidings” died as he had 
lived, he had taught – not to “redeem men” 
but to show how one must live. He does not 
resist, he does not defend his right, he takes 
no step which might ward off the worst; on 
the contrary, he provokes it. And he begs, he 
suffers, he loves with those, in those who do 
him evil. Not to resist, not to be angry, not 
to hold responsible – but to resist not even 
the evil one – to love him. (Nietzsche, 1888/ 
1976b, pp. 608-609) 
 
Nietzsche emphasised that Christ, as portrayed by 
Saint Paul, took the punishment for our sins and left 
humanity with a sense of guilt and unrepayable debt. 
Perhaps by acting out the dark side of the archetype, the 
Antichrist, and by “doing nothing whatever but wrong”, 
Nietzsche took “not the punishment but the guilt”. 
 
The Antichrist or the Cordelia of Christianity? 
 
Whatever I create and however much I love it – soon I have 
to oppose it ... 
(Nietzsche, 1883-85/1969a, p. 138) 
 
Does one not write books precisely to conceal what lies 
within us? 
(Nietzsche, 1886/1990, p. 216) 
 
Nietzsche rarely revealed his innermost self in his 
published works; this can be gleaned from his private 
letters and accounts of friends. However, in academic 
scholarship, his provocative and paradoxical utterances 
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have usually been taken at face value. But what if 
sometimes this “philosopher of masks” publically stated 
the opposite of what he felt? Then his published writings 
could be interpreted as an inverted image of his soul. 
After all, as he stressed in Ecce Homo: “I am one thing, 
my writings are another” (Nietzsche, 1888/1986, p. 69). 
 
In the famous scene in Turin’s piazza, just before his 
total mental collapse, Nietzsche, with tears streaming 
down his face, embraced a horse which had been 
beaten by the cabdriver. Such a reaction stands in clear 
contradiction to his self-professed stance against pity; 
it was a moment when the mask of hardness slipped 
(Cybulska, 2015). A friend, Meta von Salis, observed: 
“he had condemned a whole series of intense feelings 
not because he did not have them, but on the contrary 
because he had them and knew their danger” (cited in 
Gilman, 1987, p. 202). Nietzsche was acutely aware of 
his psychological vulnerability and himself recognised 
that developing a “thick skin [would be] the sole 
antidote to [his] massive inner vulnerability and capacity 
for suffering” (Nietzsche to M. von Meysenbug, 
August 11, 1875; cited in Krell & Bates, 1997, p. 92). 
His many masks, of which the mask of the Antichrist 
became the most notorious, in effect served this purpose. 
Nietzsche’s assault on Christianity – as a religion of 
the weak and the sickly – could be interpreted as an 
attack on his own sickliness and vulnerability. His 
imperative “Become hard!” has the aura of a self-
imposed command (see Nietzsche, 1883-85/1969a, p. 
231). To a friend, he confessed: “As far as Christianity 
is concerned, I hope you will believe this much: in my 
heart I’ve never held it in contempt and, ever since 
childhood, have often struggled with myself on behalf 
of its ideals” (Nietzsche to F. Overbeck, June 23, 1881; 
cited in Fuss & Shapiro, 1971, p. 55). 
 
Nietzsche staged a vociferous frontal attack on 
Christianity as constructed by St Paul, whom he called 
the “greatest apostle of vengeance”. In The Antichrist, 
written in his last creative year, he blamed Paul for 
the invention of sin, judgment and punishment as a way 
of controlling the herd (Nietzsche, 1888/1976b, pp. 627-
634). Nietzsche vehemently objected to the Pauline 
interpretation of Jesus’s martyrdom as redemption for 
our sins, whereby the crucifixion had been rendered 
symptomatic of religious self-hatred. The enormous debt 
inflicted on humanity by Christ’s sacrifice could never 
be repaid. This he saw as a complete inversion of the 
gospel of Jesus, who “had abolished the very concept of 
‘guilt’ – he had denied any cleavage between God and 
man; he lived this unity of God and man as his ‘glad 
tidings’” (ibid., p. 616). Nietzsche stressed that Jesus 
“died as he had lived, as he had taught – not to ‘redeem 
men’ but to show how one must live” (ibid., p. 608). 
He wrote: 
 
The “kingdom of God” is nothing that one 
expects; it has no yesterday and no day after 
tomorrow, it will not come in “a thousand 
years” – it is an experience of the heart; it is 
everywhere, it is nowhere. (ibid., p. 608) 
 
This sounds remarkably like the notion of Christianity 
which Nietzsche had as an inquisitive adolescent. After 
more than a decade of anti-Christian campaigning, he 
appeared to have returned to his point of departure. He 
may never truly have left that point, and in his heart he 
had remained faithful to the ideals of Christianity. We 
remember how Cordelia, that most loving and devoted 
daughter of King Lear, refused to proclaim love for her 
father because her devious sisters had already devalued 
the word. She loved him too deeply and too sincerely to 
join the chorus of flatterers and deceivers. Only as he 
carried Cordelia’s dead body in his arms did King Lear 
fully understand the redeeming power of her love, the 
love of which she would not speak. I suggest that 
Nietzsche may have adopted a similar stance towards 
Christianity. Perhaps for him to love was to express 
publically the opposite to what he intensely felt? Going 
a step further than Cordelia, he attacked what he loved, 
much in accordance to his own motto: “I attack only 
causes that are victorious” (Nietzsche, 1888/1986, p. 47). 
And he conceded that “great despisers ... are the great 
venerators and arrows of longing for the other bank” 
(Nietzsche, 1883-85/1969a, p. 44). 
 
His last letter to a friend, carrying an echo not only of 
Psalm 96, but also of Raphael’s great painting, reads: 
“Sing me a new song: the world is transfigured and all 
the heavens rejoice. [signed] The Crucified” (Nietzsche 





From early adolescence, Nietzsche showed a profound 
preoccupation with religion, Promethean rebellion, and 
the theme of a dying god. This continued throughout his 
adult life, until his mental collapse. It was a circuitous 
journey from a devout believer in God to his most 
celebrated opponent. He engaged in an intense battle 
between his inner Brutus and his inner Cordelia, a battle 
in which the assassin and the loving son interlocked in 
a deadly combat. And to this Nietzsche devoted most of 
his creative life, leaving behind a poignant diary in the 
form of his philosophy. 
 
It seems fitting to conclude with a link to Nietzsche’s 
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